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Abstract. Distance bounding protocols enable a device to establish an
upper bound on the physical distance to a communication partner so as
to prevent location spoofing, as exploited by relay attacks. Recently, Ras-
mussen and Cˇapkun (ACM-CCS’08) observed that these protocols leak
information on the location of the parties to external observers, which is
undesirable in a number of applications—for example if the leaked infor-
mation leads to the identification of the parties among a group of devices.
To remedy this problem, these authors proposed a “privacy-preserving”
distance bounding protocol, i.e. that leaks no information on the loca-
tion of the parties. The present paper reports results from an in-depth
security analysis of that new protocol, with as main result an attack that
recovers the ephemeral secrets as well as the location information of the
two parties for particular choices of parameters. Overall, our results do
not contradict the preliminary security analysis by the designers, but
rather extends it to other parts of the attack surface.
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1 Introduction
Wireless communications often have security goals that include not only tradi-
tional cryptographic notions—confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, availability—
but also guarantees about the geographical location of a communicating device.
For example, secured location information is necessary in battlefield ad hoc net-
works [1], in access control systems [2], and even in certain satellite DTV con-
ditional access systems [3]. A particular case is when a “verifier” device has to
ensure that a “prover” legitimate device is in the vicinity of the former; a trivial
countermeasure is to ensure that the signal is low enough to prevent reception
from farther locations. But this can be easily bypassed using a “proxy” device
that amplifies and forwards the signal to a remote attacker—such attacks are
known as relay attacks4. A countermeasure against relay attacks is the use of
distance bounding protocols.
4An academic proof-of-concept relay attack against cars’ remote locking has recently
been realized by the team of Cˇapkun, as reported in [4].
As their name suggests, distance bounding protocols enable a verifier device
(denoted V ) to establish an upper bound on the physical distance to an untrusted
prover device (P ). These protocols were first introduced in 1994 by Brands and
Chaum [5] to thwart distance fraud and the so-called mafia fraud attacks (two
types of relay attacks) as applied against ATM’s; the target application of [5] was
thus to check the proximity between a legitimate ATM and a user’s smartcard.
Since this seminal work, a broad range of distance bounding protocols have
been proposed for technologies as RFID [6–9], ultra-wideband (UWB) devices
[10–12], wireless ad hoc networks [13–15], or sensor networks [16].
Distance bounding can be extended to location verification (also called secure
positioning) if multiple verifiers interact with the prover: the location returned is
then in the intersection of the bounding spheres surrounding each verifier. Ded-
icated location verification protocols were proposed in [14,17]. As an alternative
to radio waves Sastry, Shankar, and Wagner [2] proposed to use ultrasound waves
to obtain better spatial resolution, due to sound’s much lower speed. However,
this technology is susceptible to wormhole attacks [18] (e.g. if the signal is con-
verted to a faster radio signal to deceive the verifier).
In 2008, Rasmussen and Cˇapkun noted [19] that known distance bounding
protocols leak information to external observers on the distance and location
of the prover and the verifier. In short, information leaks through the measure
of messages’ arrival times, which allows one to draw on the neighborhood map
hyperboles representing physical bounds on the devices’ location. Although loca-
tions and relatives distances are obvious in some cases—particularly with short-
range signals, or with only two devices in the neighborhood—attackers are often
not supposed to know them. For example, in a scenario with a large number of
devices and vehicles (as a battlefield), it can be necessary to hide the identity of
the communicating parties, who in turn need to ensure secure positioning; if an
adversary can determine the relative position of the communicating parties, it
then becomes much easier to identify them. Rasmussen and Cˇapkun thus inves-
tigated potential countermeasures against leakage of information and proposed
a privacy-preserving distance bounding protocol [19].
Our contribution. The present work focuses on the Rasmussen-Cˇapkun (hence-
forth RCˇ) privacy-preserving distance bounding protocol, as specified in [19, 5.4].
We report results from our in-depth security analysis of the RCˇ protocol’s, with
as main result an attack against its privacy-preserving property. We argue that
the properties of challenge numbers (called “nonces” in [19]) are of utmost im-
portance for the security of the protocol, presenting attacks exploiting partial
unpredictability as well as non-uniqueness. We provide a more complete spec-
ification of the protocol than in [19] in order to facilitate proof-of-concept im-
plementations. Our results do not contradict the preliminary security analysis
in [19], but rather extends it to other parts of the attack surface.
2 Background
2.1 Distance bounding protocols
A distance bounding protocol enables a verifier V to calculate an upper-bound
on his physical distance to a prover P . Distance bounding protocols are usu-
ally composed of two phases: the initialization phase and the distance bounding
phase (see Fig. 1). The initialization phase is not time critical and usually in-
volves P ’s commitment to some random number. The distance bounding phase
is time critical and usually involves a rapid bit exchange (RBE), i.e. a sequence
of challenge-responses performed at maximum bit rate. The number j of rounds
of the RBE phase is a security parameter. The verifier selects j unpredictable
challenges c1, . . . , cj and sends each of them to P . The prover generates the re-
sponses r1, . . . , rj using a function f that opens the commitment bit by bit, and
that is parameterized by j and by the secret key; V then measures the response
times ∆t1, . . . ,∆tj for each challenge.
By the end of the RBE, V verifies the correctness of the responses ri, where
i  1, 2, ..., j and calculates an upper bound on the distance of P based on
the response time ∆ti of each challenge ci, where i  1, 2, ..., j. As information
cannot travel faster than light, the distance between P and V is upper bounded
by c∆tmax {2 , where ∆tmax is the maximum delay time between sending out the
bit ci and receiving the bit ri back.
Security thus relies on the unpredictability of the challenges and on the speed-
of-light bound on the propagation of physical signals. For example with devices
operating at a 1 Gbps bit rate (thus using 1 GHz carrier waves) one bit can be
sent every nanosecond, resulting in a spatial resolution of approximately 30 cm;
at 10 Mbps, the resolution is 30 meters, which is acceptable for large-scale use
cases.
2.2 Information leakage and countermeasures
In previous distance bounding protocols, an attacker can compute the distance
between P and V just by listening on the channel, as explained in [19, §3].
This can cause serious implications in applications where location and distance
information is critical (as location-based access control). As noted earlier, relative
distance information can assist a static observer in identifying the devices that
are communicating among a larger population. To obtain information on the
distance and or location of parties, the adversary only needs to measure the
arrival time to his radio interface of two or three consecutive messages exchanged
during the RBE [19, §3].
As a general countermeasure to preclude the distance and location leakage in
distance bounding protocols, one should prevent the adversary from computing
the “time-of-flight” of the signal between the verifier and the prover. Adding a
random delay between messages transmitted during the RBE would reduce the
adversary’s knowledge but P could fool V into thinking that he waits longer
than he actually does—making himself appear closer. Alternatively, V could
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Fig. 1. A general view of distance bounding protocols (
$
ÐÝ denotes sampling uniformly
at random).
send multiple challenges to P before P responds. Nevertheless, the leakage of
information is only alleviated if the adversary is unable to distinguish between
the transmission originated from P and a transmission originated from V . As
another countermeasure, P could send challenges at a fixed bit rate. By this
mechanism, the adversary is not able to distinguish between receiving the re-
sponses from P and receiving the next challenge from V . Although this is an
effective technique, in many scenarios the adversary can still compute the dis-
tance between V and P and his relative position to V or P . We refer to [19, §4]
for a more detailed analysis of possible countermeasures.
Motivated by the fact that none of the above mentioned techniques pro-
vides effective protection against distance and location leakage, Rasmussen and
Cˇapkun [19] proposed a new distance bounding protocol. The aim of the pro-
posed protocol is to maintain the properties of existing distance bounding pro-
tocols while stoping the leakage of confidential information about distance and
location.
3 The Rasmussen-Cˇapkun protocol
The Rasmussen-Cˇapkun (RCˇ) protocol involves a prover P and a verifier V that
communicate over an insecure channel. When the protocol succeeds V is able
to calculate an upper bound on the physical distance to P , as in any distance
bounding protocol. Fig. 2 gives a detailed description of the protocol, adding
details that are only implicit in the original specification [19] (such as the au-
thentication key K2 used for computing and verifying the signatures).
Privacy preservation is ensured by hiding the actual RBE within a longer
uninterrupted stream of bits.
3.1 Notations
The description of the RCˇ protocol in Fig. 2 assumes that P and V share the
knowledge of:
– A k-bit encryption key K1.
– A k-bit authentication key K2.
– A symmetric encryption scheme pEnc,Decq.
– A symmetric authentication scheme pSign,Verifq i.e. a MAC.
– A pseudorandom generator connected to a source of physical entropy.
– A timestamp counter of precision at least 1{r seconds, where r is the bit
rate of the communication channel (for instance, with a 1 Gbps bit rate the
precision should be up to a nanosecond).
In addition the RCˇ protocol is parameterized by the bit length n of NP and NV ,
the bit length m of M , and the (approximate) bit length of the bit streams of
the distance bounding phase.
3.2 Detailed description of the protocol
The RCˇ protocol is composed of two main phases:
– Initialization phase: In this phase P selects a random NP , which he
encrypts-and-signs, before sending the resulting values to V . V decrypts
and verifies the signatures and selects a random NV and a random hid-
den marker M , which will be used in the distance bounding phase. V then
encrypts-and-signs M}NP and sends the results to P .
– Distance bounding phase: This phase involves the continuous exchange
of bit streams between P and V . It can be separated into the following
substeps:
a. Initially V sends to P random data RandV pq (i.e. generated with its
pseudorandom generator); P receives this random data, XORs it with
his own random generated data (RandV pq ` RandP pq) and sends them
back5 to V .
b. At some randomly selected6 point (within a setup window) V stops trans-
mitting random data and starts transmitting the marker M . P keeps
XORing the data received from V (at this time the M) with his own
random data (M ` RandP pq) and sends them back to V .
5It would be equivalent, both functionally and in terms of security, to send back
only RandP pq. The purpose of the XOR is rather to ensure a constant-time processing of
the challenges, since XOR must be used later in a critical step of the distance bounding
phase.
6The distribution considered is not specified in [19].
c. As soon as the hidden marker M has been transmitted V starts trans-
mitting NV and starts storing the response that he will receive. P contin-
uously monitors the data received to detect M , and as soon as it detects
M he XORs the subsequent bits received with NP followed by random
bits.
d. By the time V has sent the last bit of NV , he starts again transmitting
random data. Similarly, P starts XORing the received random data with
his own random data (RandV pq`RandP pq). After some short random de-
lay V stops transmitting data and similarly after another random delay
P ceases his transmission, to avoid leaking information on the synchro-
nization of P and V .
By the end of the distance bounding phase, V counts the number of bits received
between the time he transmitted the first bit of NV and the time he received
the first bit of NV ` NP . Given the bit rate and the processing delay, V can
calculate the round trip time and thus an upper bound on the distance to P .
4 Attacks for the RCˇ protocol with predictable nonces
This section presents attacks when nonces are predictable, as in stream ciphers
or block ciphers in CTR mode. The attacks are simple and only aim to give
evidence that unpredictability is necessary.
4.1 Are nonces nonces?
The values NP and NV are referred to as “nonces” in [19], but defined as random
numbers that are not necessarily unique. In cryptography, however, nonces are
often defined as “numbers used only once” and have as only requirement their
uniqueness, as for stream ciphers or block ciphers in CTR mode; a (long enough)
counter can there be used securely. In many applications nonces are public, and
need not be unpredictable, as their sole purpose is to ensure the “freshness” of
a protocol session.
In the context of distance bounding protocols, Hancke and Kuhn used “nonces”
defined as “unpredictable bitstrings that will never again be used for the same
purpose” [6, §3.1]. Ensuring both uniqueness and unpredictability can be achieved
by several means:
1. The combination of a counter, ensuring uniqueness, and of a random gener-
ator, ensuring unpredictability (e.g. by concatenation of the two values).
2. The use of random numbers and the storage in memory of previously gen-
erated numbers to ensure uniqueness.
3. The use of random numbers and of a probabilistic data structure to reduce
the memory requirement, compared to the previous solution. For instance,
the use of a Bloom filter to encode the set of previously used seed would
ensure uniqueness of nonces, with a false positive probability parametrized by
the size of the register. Such a solution, however, requires the implementation
of an additional—non cryptographic—hash function.
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Fig. 2. Rasmussen and Cˇapkun’s distance bounding protocol, where
$
ÐÝ denotes sam-
pling uniformly at random, ÐÝ denotes a simple message transmission, andø denotes
a continuous stream transmission at maximal bit rate. More precisely, transmissions
1,3 and 5 in the distance bounding phase compose one continuous bit-stream trans-
mission originated from V . Similarly, transmissions 2, 4 and 6 compose a continuous
bit-stream transmission originated from P .
To the best of our knowledge, it is not known how to design nonce generators of
type 1 that are both cheap to implement and that do not leak the value of the
counter, thus making nonces partially predictable. The other two solutions re-
quire non-negligible memory, and are thus inappropriate for the most lightweight
devices.
In the following, we present attacks on variants of the RCˇ protocol that
use unique and predictable, or partially predictable, nonces. We then present an
attack on the original RCˇ protocol, exploiting the non-uniqueness of nonces, and
propose efficient countermeasures.
For more about the problem of generating and resetting nonces, we refer
the reader to the extensive study by Zenner [20]. We conclude this section with
Anderson’s definition of a nonce, which proves appropriate to the RCˇ protocol:
“The term nonce can mean anything that guarantees the freshness of a message.
A nonce may, according to the context, be a random number, a serial number,
or a random challenge received from a third party. There are subtle differences
between the three approaches, such as in the level of resistance they offer to
various kinds of replay attacks. (. . . ) But in very low-cost systems, the first two
predominate, as it tends to be cheaper to have a communication channel in one
direction only.” [21, p15].
4.2 Attack with a predictable NV
Suppose that given the value of NV used at some distance bounding session, P
can determine the NV that V will use at the subsequent run of the protocol. It
follows that in the distance bounding phase of the said subsequent session, P
can start sending NV ` NP before the complete M is received, thus deceiving
V in concluding that P is closer than it actually is. Secure distance bounding is
thus not ensured.
If NV is only partially predictable (for example, a 64-bit NV is formed of a
32-bit predictable counter followed by a 32-bit random string), then the above
attack does not work.
4.3 Attack with a predictable NP
Suppose an attacker comes to know the NP of a given session, and can predict
the value of NP that will be used at the subsequent session. The privacy-breaking
attack then consists in identifying NV by searching for a collision between con-
tiguous n-bit windows from the V -to-P stream and the n-bit windows formed
from XORing each contiguous n-bit window of the P -to-V stream with NP ,
for the windows chronologically following those of the V -to-P stream. Efficient
substring search methods as the Boyer-Moore algorithm [22] may be employed.
This attack requires the recording of the sessions, and allows the attacker to
determine (a bound on) the distance of P to V , as computed by the latter.
If NP is only partially predictable, the attack works with a slightly lower
success probability, due to the increased chance of false positives. That prob-
ability depends on the parameters n and ` and on the amount of predictable
information in NP .
4.4 Discussion
The analysis in this section suggests that the best choice for P is to use totally
unpredictable nonces NP , and to choose them as random (thus potentially non-
unique) numbers for the sake of efficiency. This is exactly how NP is defined
in [19]. The next section shows how to detect and exploit repetitions of nonces,
and suggests a modification in the protocol to dissimulate nonces repetition, thus
thwarting our attack.
5 Attack for the original RCˇ protocol
We present a passive attack that recovers NP , NV , and M for two sessions of
the RCˇ protocol, which allows an attacker to deduce information on the relative
distance of P and V during each of those sessions. The distance between P and
V does not need to be the same at each session. More precisely, we show how
one can exploit repeated occurrences of the same NP in two distinct sessions to
recover the ephemeral secrets of those sessions.
Below we first give a general description of our attack, then we provide a de-
tailed complexity analysis for each part of the attack, with concrete performance
figures for typical parameters of the RCˇ protocol.
5.1 Description of the attack
The proposed attack observes many sessions of the RCˇ protocol between P and
V , and goes as follows:
1. For each session observed, record synchronously the two data streams ex-
changed after c2 is sent, and store the c1’s in a dynamically sorted ta-
ble. When a value of c1 has appeared twice—i.e., when an NP has been
repeated—stop recording sessions and delete all previous recordings but
those of the two sessions where the repetition occurred.
2. For each of the two sessions with a same NP , do the following:
(a) divide the V -to-P stream into n-bit windows V P0, V P1, . . .
(b) divide the P -to-V stream into n-bit windows PV0, PV1, . . .
(c) construct and sort a table containing all V Pi ` PVj values, 0   i   j
Since the two sessions used the same NP , each of the two tables T1 and T2
will contain an element equal to this NP . Indeed, the XOR between V Pi’s
and PVi’s will cancel the value of each NV (NV ` pNV `NP q  NP ).
3. Search for a collision between an element of T1 and an element of T2. If a
unique collision is found, then the value is NP .
4. Given NP , identify M and NV in the bit-streams of each session. Count
the number of bits between the reception of NV from the verifier and the
reception of P ’s response to deduce information on the relative positions of
P and V .
5.2 Complexity analysis
We analyse the generic time and space complexity of the proposed attack, assum-
ing that ` is the least number of bits sent by either P or V during the distance
bounding phase.
Memory required before detecting a collision. Since NP is n-bit long, an
NP will be repeated after approximately 2
n{2 sessions. One thus needs to record
of the order of 2  `  2n{2 bits.
Memory to store the tables. There are W  `  n   1 distinct windows of
n bits in the V -to-P stream. The i-th window, starting from the first one when
i  1, is XORed with W  i1 n-bit windows of the P -to-V stream. Thus, there
are in total:
N 
W¸
i1
pW  1  iq  W
2  3W
2
entries in each table.
Computation to sort the tables. Sorting with comparison-based algorithm
(as heap sort or quicksort) takesOpN logNq comparisons, whereN is the number
of n-bit words in the table (the above values). As the cost of comparing n-bit
elements is arguably proportional to n, this gives a complexity OpnN logNq.
Using radix sort, one can achieve complexity OpnNq complexity (see e.g. [23]
for a similar analysis). However, note that this analysis ignores the extra cost
caused by memory accesses to a large table, which arguably makes the above
estimates misleading.
An alternative to classical sort algorithm, discussed in [23], is to use Schimm-
ler’s [24] or Schnorr-Shamir’s [25] algorithms on a parallel machine. The later
sorts N elements using a
?
N?N mesh of N processors in approximately 3?N
steps.
Number of false alarms. After sorting the two N -element tables, we search
for an element common in the two tables. One collision is known to exist, as
each table is known to contain NP . Other collisions that may be found are thus
“false positives”. The expected number of false alarms is the expected number
of collisions besides the known NP collision, that is pN2  1q{2n.
Efficiency for typical parameters. In section [19, §5.4] is discussed an imple-
mentation of the protocol over a communication channel of bit rate 1 Gbps (i.e.,
one bit is transmitted each nanosecond) with hidden markers M of m  160
bits, such that the distance bounding phase lasts (approximately) 500 millisec-
onds. In this case streams of 230 bits are exchanged in each direction. As noted
Table 1. Evaluation of our attack for several typical parameters (length of RBE `, in
bits, and length of the nonces n). Time complexity of sorting the table is that of the
Schnorr-Shamir parallel algorithm. The number of collisions is at least one, in which
case the unique collision corresponds to the solution for NP . If more than one collision
are found, then the solution is known to lie in this set.
pn, `q
sessions memory tables sorting number of
monitored required size (N) time collisions
p32, 210q 216 227 219 211 26
p32, 220q 216 237 239 221 245
p64, 210q 232 243 219 210 1
p64, 220q 232 253 239 221 214
p64, 230q 232 263 259 231 253
p128, 210q 264 275 219 211 1
p128, 220q 264 285 239 221 1
p128, 230q 264 295 259 231 1
in [19, §5.4], however, an attacker has no way to verify a guess of M , but only a
guess of NP in time approximately N for each of the 2
n possible values.
No value is suggested for the length n of the random numbers NP and NV ,
nor for the length of K1 or K2. We shall thus study the efficiency of our attack
for the typical values of n, as 32, 64, or 128. Note that the cost of an oﬄine
attack recovering NP and NV (and thus M) for a given session has complexity
N2n, as observed above.
Table 1 summarizes the complexity of our attack for various combinations of
choices of n and `. The theoretical complexity bottleneck (in time and space) is
the recording of 2n{2 sessions of the protocol. The attack is clearly practical when
using 32-bit nonces with a 210-bit long distance bounding phase; increasing the
nonce to 64-bit still gives an attack arguably practical (“only” 1 Tb of memory
is necessary). In any case, the attack is only applicable if a large number of
protocol sessions can be initiated, and if the communication can be captured
and recorded at an appropriate rate (which, admittedly, may be impossible for
the highest frequencies).
6 Strengthening the RCˇ protocol
We propose the following modifications to the RCˇ protocol to thwart our collision-
based attack, and as countermeasures against future attacks on components or
implementations of the attacks.
– Probabilistic encryption, so that repetitions of NP cannot be detected
(since two ciphertexts of the same NP are then distinct). This modification
alone is sufficient to thwart the attack in §5.
– Better nonces: as discussed in §4, unique NP nonces should be used, if
possible, for example by using Bloom filters to save memory at the price of
a non-zero false positive probability.
– Encrypt-then-sign instead of encrypt-and-sign; the former being at least
as secure as the latter, and benefiting of provable security properties (cf. [26]).
– Distinct keys for encryption and for authentication; this modification is
included in our description of the protocol, but was not explicit in its original
definition in [19].
7 Security against relay attacks
In this section we analyse the security of the RCˇ protocol against distance, mafia,
and terrorist fraud attacks. For a detailed description of each of the attacks we
urge the reader to consult [5].
7.1 Distance fraud
A distance fraud attack is possible when there is no relationship between the
challenge bits and the response bits exchanged during the distance verification.
If a fraudulent prover P knows when the challenge bits will be sent, it can trick
V by sending the response bits before receiving the challenge bits. Thus, V
computes a wrong upper bound regarding its physical distance to P .
In RCˇ, the response bit-streams are functions of the challenges. More pre-
cisely, the response bit-stream Nv ` NP is used for distance-checking. So, the
probability that an attacker performs a successful distance fraud attack is upper
bounded by p1{2qn [5], where n is the bit-length of NV and NP .
7.2 Mafia fraud
The best known strategy to launch a successful mafia fraud attack consists in
querying the prover P before receiving the challenge from the verifier V and
obtaining the right response for this value. When the actual challenge bit is sent
to P , in half of all cases, the adversary knows the response beforehand because
this value coincides with the value that was previously queried. In the other half
of cases, the attacker can answer a random challenge. If a protocol is vulnerable
to the above attack, the success probability with which a mafia fraud attack can
succeed is bounded by p 34 qn, which is higher than the optimal value p 12 qn, where
n is the number of bits exchanged in the RBE.
In [27], Munilla and Peinado proposed a protocol inspired by [6] in which the
success probability of an adversary to accomplish a mafia fraud attack is reduced.
The proposal is based on void challenges in order to detect that P is not waiting
to receive the challenge bits. A void challenge is a challenge which V intentionally
leaves without sending. That is, the challenge bit sent by P can take three
different values t0, 1, voidu. If V detects that a response bit is received during
the interval of a void challenge, the dishonest prover P is detected. Although,
from a theoretical point of view the proposal is interesting, the feasibility of this
scheme is questionable since it requires three physical states.
Alternatively, Rasmussen and Cˇapkun introduced the use of a hidden marker
M which provides the advantage of detecting whether P is waiting to receive the
challenge bit-streams. The position of the hidden marker M is randomly chosen
in the setup window. The adversary may try to guess the start of hidden marker
M and then may use the strategy of asking in advance to know the response
of the bit-stream NV . Let r be the bit rate of the channel and consider a setup
window of ωs seconds. The success probability with which a mafia attack can
succeed is upper bounded by:

1
2

rωs


3
4

n
where n is the bit-length of NV and NP . Thus, the probability of running a
successful mafia fraud attack is reduced. Nevertheless, there are some draw-
backs that the reader should be aware. First of all, the number of bits (streams)
exchanged during the RBE is significantly increased in comparison with when
only the challenge bits (NV bit-stream) are sent. Secondly, the time required to
complete the distance checking is thus longer, which means a decrease in the
efficiency of the protocol and an increase in the power consumption required by
P .
7.3 Terrorist fraud
This attack can be viewed as an extension of the mafia fraud. In this fraud, the
dishonest prover collaborates with a terrorist prover P : P uses P to convince V
that he lies in close proximity, while he does not. Despite the cooperation between
P and P , it is assumed that the long-term secret key of P is not revealed to P .
In the RCˇ protocol, a dishonest P can reveal NP and M to a terrorist
prover P , without compromising the secret keys K1 and K2. Then, the distance-
bounding phase is executed between V and P , while the latter is nearer to V
than P is. Thus, P misleads V into believing that P is located nearer. Thus, the
probability that an attacker runs a successfully terrorist fraud attack is 1. This
attack can be avoided by making interdependent the bit-streams tNP ,Mu and
the secret keys, as in [28,29].
8 Conclusions
We reported the first third-party cryptanalysis of the Rasmussen-Cˇapkun privacy-
preserving distance bounding protocol: we identified strengths and weaknesses
of that protocol, and presented a detailed attack exploiting nonce collisions. We
proposed simple modifications to the protocol to thwart our attack and to en-
hance the overall security of the protocol. These modifications include the use of
probabilistic encryption and the implementation of an encrypt-then-sign (rather
than encrypt-and-sign) scheme. Furthermore, we investigated the security of the
RCˇ protocol against distance, terrorist and mafia fraud attacks.
Our detailed definition of the protocol and the results of our in-depth secu-
rity analysis are complementary to the preliminary security and implementation
analysis in [19]. The natural next step is a proof-of-concept implementation of
the Rasmussen-Cˇapkun protocol.
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